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The problem of planning for housing development has never been wholly resolved in England 
but instead re-invented in different guises as successive governments have sought to reflect values 
and interests in ascendancy at any particular moment. This paper seeks to trace and explain how 
this has happened over the past 40 years, and especially between 1997 and 2010, by reviewing 
policy developments around the overall supply of housing land, the split between brownfield and 
greenfield locations and the extent to which market-based information has been considered 
relevant to planning decisions. The account points to policy evolution, rather than radical 









Disputes about housing land release have proved an inherently controversial feature of the British 
planning system. The economic importance of housing supply means that the British 
determination to achieve democratic control over the location of new housing has had much 
broader social and economic consequences. For two reasons, no settled consensus has yet 
emerged, or indeed is ever likely to emerge, around the crucial choices that have to be made about 
new housing development. The first concerns the acute divergence of interest between relevant 
stakeholders and especially between those who see exchange value in land and those who 
emphasise its environmental value. The second reflects the ambiguous nature of the planning 
system itself, which, while seeking to influence market outcomes such as the location of 
development, remains heavily reliant on the initiative of market actors for the delivery of important 
public policy goals such as increased home ownership.  
 
Putting these two reasons together suggests that planning for housing development may well 
exemplify the kind of a wicked problem1 described by Rittel and Webber (1973) which, as a result 
of elusiveness, subjectivity, uniqueness and complexity, distinguish social problems in open 
systems from scientific problems in closed systems.  
 
Wicked problems are elusive because according to Rittel and Webber (1973), they have no 
definitive formulations, with the image of the problem gradually emerging alongside, and indeed 
 
1 Rittel and Webber (1973, p. 160) make clear that they use the term “wicked” to describe a problem that is malignant, 
vicious, tricky or aggressive, not one that is ethically deplorable. 
2 
 
reflecting, potential solutions. Moreover, there is no single definitive solution to a wicked problem 
– devoting more time and resources is always likely to produce an improved solution. 
 
Wicked problems are essentially subjective since, according to Rittel and Webber (1973), potential 
solutions should not be seen as true or false, but rather as good or bad, the judgement of which 
varies according to individual interests, value-sets and ideological predilections. There can also be 
numerous explanations of why potential solutions have not worked, with people choosing the 
explanation that best conforms to their own ‘world-view’. 
 
Rittel and Webber (1973) stress that every wicked problem is essentially unique, even if it appears 
to be similar to previous problems, since some additional distinguishing feature will always be 
present. 
 
Since every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem, they are also highly 
complex. Potential solutions have repercussions that may not become apparent for some time and 
which may turn out to be utterly undesirable. As Rittel and Webber (1973) argue, neither can 
potential solutions be tested in advance by trial and error – they have to be implemented, leaving 
consequences that cannot be undone. It may never be clear if all potential solutions have yet been 
identified – when to stop looking for solutions is a matter of judgement. Despite these 
characteristics, planners are expected to find solutions to wicked problems and are held liable for 
the consequences of their actions by all those affected. 
 
This paper therefore considers the extent to which planning for housing development should be 
regarded as a wicked problem by exploring how over at least the past 40 years, respective 
stakeholders have fought over three main policy questions: 
 
1. Where the overall supply of development land is regulated by the State, what is the best 
way to manage and monitor the release of that land? This question can be traced back to 
the early 1970s, when worries about perceived shortages of building land began to attract 
political attention. 
 
2. What should be the split between greenfield and brownfield development? This question 
can be traced back to a broadening interest in the concept of sustainability from the late 
1980s. 
 
3. What are the broader economic effects of State control of land release, and specifically 
what kind of market information is relevant in deciding planning policy? This question is 
a more recent addition to the debate. Although it began to emerge from the early 1990s, it 
remained of more peripheral concern to policy-makers until the early years of 21st century, 
when the Barker Review (2003 and 2004) placed it at the forefront of policy making. 
 
The three main sections of this paper consider these questions in turn, especially in relation to 
urban areas. While the policy drama has been played out across the UK under its different devolved 
administrations, the paper concentrates on the record of the Labour Government in England 
between 1997 and 20102. The final section summarises how the three questions have been 
addressed and evaluates whether they represent essentially wicked problems. 
 
2 In May 2010, after thirteen years in office, the Labour Government was replaced by a Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government, which immediately made significant changes to the English policy framework of 
planning for housing development. All Regional (Spatial) Strategies were revoked and the Regional Planning Bodies, 
responsible for their preparation, abolished. The National Housing and Planning Advice Unit was closed down and 




MANAGING AND MONITORING THE SUPPLY OF HOUSING LAND 
 
Even after a comprehensive planning system was introduced in 1947, large-scale greenfield 
development continued apace. In particular locations, it was driven forward during the 1950s and 
1960s by public-sector development of new towns and peripheral local authority housing estates. 
During the early 1970s, the growth of speculative housebuilding, rapid house price inflation and 
greater public participation combined to bring land shortages on to the political agenda. These 
pressures created the potentially explosive political cocktail that all successive governments have 
sought to manage. Subsequent policy reviews and re-interpretations obscure one important fact - 
that the inherent controversy around housing land supply is not essentially a clash of techniques 
but rather of values and interests. To explain why particular technical approaches have been 
preferred in particular documents, we thus need to know which values and interests were in the 
ascendancy at that time.  
 
Assessing housing need and demand 
 
Demographic forecasts of population and household growth have long informed the amount of 
land allocated for new dwellings. Such forecasting is not an exact science but is open to much 
interpretation, especially around migration assumptions. Development interests have often argued 
that demographic forecasts underestimate likely growth, with environmental interests claiming the 
reverse. For most of the 1980s and 1990s, the Secretary of State, playing the role of final arbitrator, 
tended to side more with development interests and push final housing numbers above those 
proposed by local planning authorities. Two important changes then occurred. Procedurally, the 
Secretary of State largely withdrew from the role of final arbitrator even for structure plans, 
allowing more independence for local planning authorities. More importantly, in 1998, the new 
Labour Government adopted the approach of ‘plan, monitor and manage’ in which events on the 
ground, including the extent of housebuilding actually taking place, were to be accorded much 
greater influence in setting future levels of growth, and thus dispensed with the longstanding 
‘predict and provide’ method, which had closely linked demographic forecasting to proposed 
housing numbers. 
 
What seemed like an important victory for environmental interests was, however, short-lived. 
Although the concept of ‘plan, monitor and manage’ was embodied in the seminal revisions to 
PPG 3: Housing introduced in 2000 (DETR, 2000), within only three years the Government’s 
appointment of Kate Barker to conduct a fundamental review of housing supply signalled the 
resurgence of development interests and their capacity to reframe an apparently technical agenda 
to their own advantage. Essentially, ‘market signals’ (see below) began to be placed alongside 
demographic forecasts in determining appropriate levels of housing growth.  
 
Responding to Barker in 2005, the Labour Government thus set a target of 200,000 net additional 
dwellings each year in England, compared to the then provision of about 150,000 net annual 
additions (H.M. Treasury and ODPM, 2005). Two years later, at the height of the housing boom 
in mid-2007, the building target was raised to 240,000 net additional dwellings each year in 
 
described as the ‘top down target culture’ of the previous Labour Government would be replaced by a new emphasis 
on ‘localism’ in which local authorities would be rewarded for encouraging new development by such incentives as 
reaping the full benefit of council tax receipts on new dwellings for a period of probably seven years. These changes 
are beyond the scope of this paper, and represent the start of a new era in planning for housing development, creating 
yet another approach to addressing the wicked problems reviewed here, which itself will no doubt become an 




England, intended to produce two million new homes by 2016 and three million by 2020 (DCLG, 
2007a). 
 
Managing the release of land to meet housing need and demand 
 
Over the past three decades, managing housing land release has become as important a policy 
function as forecasting need and demand. The concept of a readily available five-year housing land 
supply can be traced back to Michael Heseltine’s time as Secretary of State for the Environment 
in the early 1980s. Here, two early circulars proved particularly influential. Department of the 
Environment Circular 9/80 introduced the requirement for a five-year land supply and for housing 
land availability studies undertaken jointly by local authorities and the housebuilding industry 
(DoE, 1980a). In the absence of a five-year supply, Circular 22/80 introduced “a presumption in 
favour of granting planning applications for housing, except where there are clear planning 
objections” (DoE, 1980b) 
 
For at least the next decade, housebuilders achieved a privileged position within the policy-making 
process, through their involvement in Joint Housing Land Availability Studies. By the late 1980s, 
however, the system had degenerated into one characterised as ‘planning by appeal’ whereby local 
authorities clearly unable to demonstrate an effective five-year land supply found Heseltine’s 
successors as Secretary of State regularly ruling in favour of appeals brought by housebuilders. 
Some balance was restored when the Planning and Compensation Act 1991 raised the status of 
development plans in decision-making. This, combined with brownfield targets of 50% from 1995 
and 60% from 1998 (see below), reflected the increasing influence of environmental interests 
during the 1990s and their success in moving the policy agenda much more in the direction of 
sustainability. 
 
This success perhaps reached its high point in the revisions to PPG 3 in 2000, in which Urban 
Capacity Studies finally replaced Housing Land Availability Studies, and a sequential test was 
introduced allowing local planning authorities to resist greenfield development while suitable 
brownfield sites remained undeveloped. Urban capacity studies were seen by Murdoch (2004) as 
the technological means by which the ‘brownfield first/greenfield last rationality’ was promoted 
centrally, although their lack of methodological precision meant that competing rationalities could 
survive, if individual local authorities preferred. 
 
By 2001, however, the total number of new dwellings completed in England had fallen to a then 
record post-war low of 129,500, compared to almost 164,000 in 1990. Development interests 
blamed the planning system for their lack of achievement and were successful in urging another 
major policy revision in 2006, with the publication of PPS 3: Housing.  
 
It is arguable that PPS 3 (DCLG, 2006) rewound the clock not simply to 2000, but well before it. 
Urban Capacity Studies were abandoned, and the sequential test apparently discarded (although an 
important appeal decision later suggested that had not been the case3). Instead, local authorities 
were required to identify not merely an immediate supply of deliverable housing sites for the first 
five years of a local development framework, but also a further supply of potential development 
sites for the next five years, together with either yet more sites or broad locations for growth for 
the following five years. Paragraph 34 of PPS 3 defined deliverable sites as those already available, 
which offered a suitable development location contributing to the creation of sustainable mixed 







Significantly, Housing Land Availability Studies re-emerged in PPS 3 (albeit with broader 
stakeholder involvement) as Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessments (DCLG, 2007b). 
Unlike Urban Capacity Studies, Strategic Housing Land Availability Assessments were expected 
to look for suitable housing sites “in rural settlements, brownfield sites outside settlement 
boundaries and suitable greenfield sites, as well as broad locations” (DCLG, 2007b, paragraph 16). 
SHLAAs were matched by Strategic Housing Market Assessments (DCLG, 2007c), which were 
intended to provide local authorities with the necessary market data and information for decision-
making. 
 
Even before Barker reported, it had become apparent that significantly increased output from the 
housebuilding industry would require the Government not merely to relax its regulatory 
framework but to take more direct action to boost supply. This realisation had initially been 
reflected in the Sustainable Communities Plan of 2003, which promised an additional 200,000 new 
homes on top of those previously planned in four growth areas in the south-east of England, at a 
cost of over £22 billion (ODPM, 2003). Alongside this, action was taken to tackle low demand 
and abandonment affecting over a million homes in the Midlands and North, by setting up nine 
housing market renewal pathfinders. 
 
By 2007, to move towards an annual housebuilding target of 240,000 new dwellings in England, 
the Government committed itself to a further 150,000 to 200,000 new homes in the next round 
of Regional Spatial Strategies (in addition to the 1.6 million included in the RSSs then current), 
another 150,000 homes to be built through two rounds of the Growth Points initiative and 
between 25,000 and 100,000 planned further homes in five eco-towns (DCLG, 2007a). Ironically 
then, in the period immediately before the collapse in speculative housebuilding and towards the 
end of the longest period of postwar growth in the UK, the Labour Government geared itself up 




In 1995, John Gummer, the last Conservative Secretary of State for the Environment, introduced 
the first brownfield housing target requiring 50% of all new homes in England to be built on re-
used sites (DoE, 1995). Two strands came together to drive this policy change. On the one hand, 
urban regeneration had become an increasingly important part of Conservative thinking, especially 
where driven by the private sector. On the other hand, the growing influence of sustainability from 
the late 1980s caused a fundamental review of Government thinking towards the environment, 
and demanded tangible action across a broad range of policy fields. A brownfield target thus 
offered a clear opportunity for Gummer to bring together sustainability and urban regeneration. 
 
Despite initial concerns that the 50% brownfield target would not survive the election of a Labour 
Government in 1997, John Prescott, the incoming Secretary of State, actually decided to announce 
a more ambitious commitment, reflecting increased emphasis on urban regeneration or urban 
renaissance, as it was later termed by the Urban Task Force (1999). Accordingly, as the revised 
PPG 3 made clear: “The national target is that by 2008, 60% of additional housing should be 
provided on previously-developed land and through the conversion of existing buildings” (DETR, 
2000, paragraph 23). This national target was to be translated to each region and thence to each 
local planning area. During this process, Prescott enthusiastically set out increasing regional 
brownfield targets (Adams and Watkins, 2002) and declaring success as each year’s Land Use 




Unfortunately, however, brownfield targets encouraged politicians to think that mere target setting 
was enough to deliver regeneration on the ground. Indeed, political concentration on the relative 
proportion of housing (rather than the absolute numbers of homes) built on brownfield land, 
disguised the limited real achievements of the Labour Government’s initial term. For while the 
relative proportion of new homes built on brownfield land or achieved through conversions rose 
from 56% in 1997 to 64% in 2003, the number of homes actually constructed there fell from 
83,716 to 82,899 – virtually the same absolute figure as in 1993 (Adams et al, 2010). In other words, 
relative success in relation to the brownfield target was more than cancelled out by the overall 
decline in housebuilding at that time. This disappointing absolute brownfield performance was 
turned round only from 2002 onwards. Here, two factors were crucial. 
 
First, the Sustainable Communities Plan introduced a more explicitly interventionist approach to 
brownfield development from 2003 to underpin the target figure. This involved “a new strategic 
role” for English Partnerships “… to find and assemble land, especially brownfield and publicly 
owned land, for sustainable development” (ODPM, 2003, p. 40). Crucially, English Partnerships 
was charged with developing a comprehensive national strategy for brownfield land and allocated 
over £500 million over three years to find and assemble housing sites. Although this was not 
devoted entirely to brownfield development, it enabled the agency to play a central enabling role 
in developing the Thames Gateway, the fourth and largely brownfield growth area identified in the 
Sustainable Communities Plan. Other actions taken by English Partnerships included recourse to 
compulsory purchase powers to assemble brownfield land and an explicit programme targeted at 
the 17,000 hectares of hardcore brownfield land registered on the National Land Use Database, 
which had remained vacant or derelict since 1993. By 2005, the results of this more interventionist 
approach to brownfield land were beginning to show, with almost 123,000 dwellings completed 
on brownfield sites in that year (Adams et al., 2010). 
 
Secondly, the rapidly rising housing market in the period up to 2007 made brownfield development 
increasingly lucrative for the speculative housebuilders, especially in city centres. Crucially, in a 
rising market, policy operated by making brownfield development a more attractive business 
proposition through choking off opportunities elsewhere. This micro-economic linkage was 
recognised by Barker (2003, p. 147) who commented that “Additionally, constraining the supply 
of greenfield land will increase demand for brownfield land. This will increase the price of 
brownfield land which should consequently promote increased supply as the value of brownfield 
land for housing comes to exceed its alternative use value.” In short, economic imperative proved 
as important as political dictat in promoting brownfield redevelopment. 
 
PLANNING AND MARKET SIGNALS 
 
Despite widespread academic debate since the late 1980s on the economic impact of the planning 
system (see, for example, Bramley, 1993: Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989 and 1996), this debate had 
little direct impact on planning policy before Barker’s (2003 and 2004) review of housing supply. 
Her findings produced intense policy interest in housing affordability, as summarised in the 
Housing Green Paper: 
 
“House prices have risen more quickly than earnings in all regions. On average, lower quartile 
house prices are now more than seven times lower quartile earnings. This is not just a problem in 
the south. Affordability problems in the northern regions (measured as the ratio of lower quartile 
house prices to earnings) have risen sharply since 1997. In some areas the ratio has more than 
doubled. For example in Warrington, affordability has worsened by 140% with the ratio reaching 




What most sharply divided opinion was Barker’s conclusion that the UK’s above average house 
price inflation and worsening affordability could be attributed to a restrictive planning system and 
hence could be alleviated by significantly greater land releases. It is not the place of this paper to 
review both sides of this argument in detail, but it is worth highlighting the work of CPRE (2007) 
and Cheshire (2008) as well-argued contributions to the debate on whether, and to what extent, 
house price inflation would weaken and affordability improve, if much higher levels of housing 
development were to be permitted. 
 
The Government itself saw strong connectivity between housing growth and affordability, 
commissioning and publishing a controversial affordability model (ODPM, 2005a) and 
establishing the National Housing and Planning Advice Unit, which in 2008 produced a much-
disputed target range for future housing growth in each English region (NHPAU, 2008). 
Significantly, both were predicated on macro-economic modelling, which sought to link house 
prices, earnings, migration patterns, household formation and employment to land release at the 
regional level. This reflected the increasing role of economics in driving spatial policy, to the extent 
that the Department for Communities and Local Government had begun to think of itself as an 
‘economics department’ (DCLG, 2007d). However, it remained unclear how the results of such 
regionally-based analysis would connect with the institutional structure and micro-economic 
construction of local markets and importantly, whether substantially higher levels of 
housebuilding, even if achievable, could be reconciled with urban regeneration and the brownfield 
target. 
 
Nevertheless, Barker’s call for the planning system to be more responsive to market signals was 
reflected more strongly in the 2005 consultative draft of the new PPS 3: Housing (ODPM, 2005b), 
than in the final version, which emerged a year later (DCLG, 2006). While the former proposed 
that speedy take-up of allocated development sites might trigger further immediate releases, the 
latter contained only a more general expectation for local planning authorities to take market 
information in account. Moreover, research commissioned by the DCLG (2007e) highlighted both 
the complexity of incorporating market signals within the planning process and the impossibility 
of finding a relevant common indicator for this. A Government advice note issued at the same 
time recommended caution in the use of simple quantitative demand indicators and suggested that 




This paper has reviewed three main policy questions around planning for housing development 
contested by respective stakeholders over the past 40 years, and especially between 1997 and 2010. 
In each case, what comes across most sharply is the incidence of conflict, turbulence and at times, 
simple re-invention of wheels that have been previously discarded, rather than mutual learning or 
progression towards an agreed rationality. 
 
The first question concerned the best way to manage and monitor land release. Debates here 
demonstrated how hard it has proved to secure consensus around long-term development targets 
or even to establish agreed methodologies to monitor short term progress. 
 
The balance between greenfield and brownfield development was the focus of the second 
question. Here, what Ministers failed to grasp until too late was the enormous challenge involved 
in persuading the speculative housebuilding industry to create sustainable communities at 




The third question centred on the relevance of market-based information to planning decisions. 
Despite comprehensive planning legislation, governments over the past 40 years have become 
increasingly dependent on the private sector to initiate development. That explains why more 
market-orientated forms of planning can be traced back at least to the early 1980s, when 
government circulars on housing land release began to reflect the interests of those in the private 
sector responsible for housing production. In this sense, increased concern with market signals 
within planning policy is not entirely new, but rather represents the most recent capture of the 
relevant technical agenda by development interests. 
  
These insights highlight the inherent ‘wickedness’ of planning for housing development as a policy 
problem in the sense that it is indeed characterised by elusiveness, subjectivity, uniqueness and 
complexity. Successors to the Labour Government of 1997 to 2010 will do well to recognise and 
take account of these characteristics. Elusiveness is evident in the uncertainty around whether the 
problem is really about land shortages, low rates of production or house price inflation, or some 
combination of these three. The different policy ‘solutions’ recommended by those who see either 
environmental or exchange value in land reveal how essentially subjective is any definition of the 
problem. While there may be much common debate around new housing development across the 
country, local twists in market conditions, political alliances and development actors make it hard 
to predict planning outcomes and ensure the uniqueness of each new occasion the problem is 
rehearsed. Finally, the complexity of planning for housing development helps explain the short 
shelf life of perceived solutions, which appear to come and go (and sometimes come back) at a 
rapid pace. Thus, reflecting Fischer’s (2003) view that policy frames determine what actors perceive 
to be the facts and the normative prescriptions these generate, although no Government may ever 
be able to solve the problem of planning for housing development, each will be likely to re-frame 
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